Privacy is often cited as the main reason to adopt a multiagent approach for a certain problem. This also holds true for multiagent planning. Still, a metric to evaluate the privacy performance of planners is virtually non-existent. This makes it hard to compare dierent algorithms on their performance with regards to privacy.
Introduction
Alice and Bob each own a small transportation company. Both companies are often faced with empty rides, where they have to bring cargo somewhere, but have no cargo for the return trip. Needless to say, the margins are thin on such trips. In order to increase their prots, they decide to try to reduce the number of empty rides by cooperating. When Bob has cargo from, say, Paris to Roma, and Alice from Nice to Bruxelles, Bob will send his truck on the tour Paris-Roma-Nice-Bruxelles and charge Alice a reduced fee. Of course, this also applies to Alice taking on tasks from Bob, and so they both prot from such a scheme.
After a successful trial, Alice and Bob decide to automate the process of nding empty rides.
As they both nd it unacceptable to give up their autonomy, they decide to extend the planning software that each of them uses with an interaction module. The interaction modules exchange information about the plans, and build a global plan, capturing information from both plans that may be used in nding the empty rides. This works well, and there is much rejoicing at both companies' increased revenue.
Some time later, Eve asks to join the system. Figuring that there is more chance of compatible rides with three companies than with two, Alice and Bob allow Eve to install a similar interaction module to her planning system. Things go well for a while, but then an important client of Bob's does not prolong their contract, citing a cheaper alternative.
Shortly after, Alice experiences the same. Upon investigation, it turns out that Eve has learned about the cost structures of Alice and Bob through the information that was exchanged among the three parties and has used this knowledge to her advantage. Suddenly, Alice and Bob have a very dierent opinion on automated interaction... While exaggerated and simplied, the above scenario presents a real concern that selfinterested agents may have when it comes to multiagent planning. The agents employed a (simplistic) multiagent planning (MAP) technique in order to preserve their autonomy, only to nd out that their privacy was grossly intruded upon. For self-interested agents that value their sense of autonomy and privacy this is unacceptable. Unfortunately, though, while privacy is often cited as one of the reasons behind multiagent planning techniques, there has been very little attention paid to dening just what privacy means in the context of MAP.
In principle, multiagent planning oers a way to cooperate while being in control of which information is shared and with whom. Yet it is impossible to cooperate without sharing any information. At the very least, a pair of cooperating agents has to agree on which sub tasks are being carried out by one agent on behalf of the other, an approach taken by, for example, the MPOPR system [33] and the plan merging approach of De Weerdt [5] . Several approaches, such as (Generalised) Partial Global Planning (GPGP; see, for example, [7] ) go even further and share detailed parts of their plans, or even their full plans, as in the case of (IG-)DGP [14] and the unnamed system proposed by Zhang et al. [42] . In the latter approaches, more information is exchanged than in the former. Clearly, this must lead to a poorer performance when it comes to privacy. This raises the obvious question of how to measure this performance. Just how much privacy is lost by exchanging certain information? How can we evaluate which method is better than another when privacy is concerned? Unfortunately, these questions are not easily answered, as evidenced by the lack of existing work despite numerous referrals to 'privacy'. Firstly, we have to decide what the value of the information is that is obtained. As plans have potentially many parallel actions (that may possibly overlap in time) and have an unknown length, this is not straightforwardly dened. We then have to compare this to a base case, where we are faced with the same questions. Moreover, we cannot answer these questions without some model of the other agent's capabilities.
In this paper, we present an answer to these questions in the form of a metric for privacy loss based on Shannon's Theory of Information [23] . We show how the concept of uncertainty that underpins Shannon's work can be interpreted in the context of plans, and how we can derive a measure from this for the information that is gained during negotiations on plan construction or coordination. Intuitively, the uncertainly relates to the number of possible plans the agent may have.
1 In this work, we are primarily interested in the form 1 Our earlier work [31, 32] proposed a denition for the classical case (totally ordered plans in unit time) based on the number of dierent actions that are possible in a given time step. The present work allows for parallel, durative actions. of the plan (i.e. modulo dierent objects). Therefore, we consider just the action types, not the fully instantiated actions. To count the possible plans, we need additional information on the planning domain. This information is used to rule out valid, yet illogical plans from being taken into consideration. For example, in a lot of domains, it is possible to undo an action (e.g. in the well-known Blocks domain [13] , we can put a block onto the table and then back to its original position). Sequences of doing a certain action followed by an immediate undoing of the same are certainly possible, but almost never rational. Because of the additional information that is required, the measure is particularly useful for agents that are the target of privacy invasion, and want to assess their risks. For example, during negotiations, they can evaluate the dierent options on their privacy aspects, and take this into account when making bids or proposals. When used as such, the measure provides a worst-case analysis, for in reality the other agent (usually) has less complete knowledge and hence a higher degree of uncertainty. Since one cannot know what the other agent believes about ones domain, we believe this is the safest option.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we give a formal denition of the multiagent planning problem as we consider it in this paper. Then, we give a brief overview of our approach in Section 3, followed by a denition of the additional information we require in Section 4. In Section 5, then, we propose an algorithm to compute our measure. Before concluding, we give an overview of related work in Section 6.
2
The Multiagent Planning Problem
In this section we will dene what we understand by a multiagent planning problem. A standard denition for multiagent planning does not exist, unfortunately, and most people have their own intuition. In order to prevent any confusion, we dene the problem as considered in this paper. Intuitively, we consider a group of agents. Each agent has its own, private planning problem. This consists of (i ) the set of operators that this agent may carry out, (ii) that part of the (common) initial state the agent is aware of, and (iii) a set of goals.
Notice that all agents have the same initial state, although they may have a limited view of it. Thus, the initial states may dier, but have to be consistent. Since, in general, the goals of dierent agents may be mutually exclusive, we deal with a form of over subscription planning [30] .
Denition 1. Formally, we consider an instance of the multiagent planning problem for a set of n agents A = {1 . . . n} to be a set Π A = i∈A Π i . Following [3] , we dene the problem
• F i is a set of ground atomic formulae, the propositions used to describe the domain of agent i; • I i ⊂ F i describes the initial state visible to agent i. The global initial state is denoted by I = i∈A I i and is conict-free; and
• G i ⊂ F i is the set of goals i wants to attain. In contrast to I, the set of all goals G = i∈A G i may have conicts.
The solution to a multiagent planning problem is a multiagent plan, a (partially) ordered sequence of actions. This plan can be split into separate plans for each agent. Our ideas revolve around Shannon's Theory of Information [23] . It is based on the notion that the amount of information contained in a message exchange can be measured by the amount with which the uncertainty about certain facts decreases. Whereas Shannon followed a rigorous route in deriving his famous function, we follow the more intuitive explanation given by Schneider [22] in setting out the background.
Information is closely linked to uncertainty. Suppose we have M dierently coloured balls in a hat, and we intend to randomly draw one. Now we are faced with a certain degree of uncertainty regarding the colour of the ball we will draw. When we draw a ball, we get some information (on the colour of this ball) and our uncertainty (regarding the colour of this ball) decreases. Shannon's work gives an answer to the questions of how to measure this uncertainty. If we assume an equal probability for all of the balls, we would like to say that we have an uncertainty of M colours. However, we would also like our measure of uncertainty to be additive, which leads to the following formula for the uncertainty H:
What happens if there are fewer colours then balls, with some colours more likely than others? First, let us rearrange Equation 1 in terms of the probability P = 1 M that any colour is drawn: H = log 2 (M ) = − log 2 ( 1 M ) = − log 2 (P ). Now, let P i be the probability of drawing colour i, with
The surprisal [27] of drawing the i th colour is dened by analogy with − log 2 (P ) to be
In the generalised case, uncertainty is the average surprisal for the innite string of colours drawn (returning each ball before drawing a new one). For a string of nite length N , with colour i appearing N i times, this average is
Ni N u i . For an innite string, the frequency Ni N approaches P i , the probability of drawing this colour. The average surprisal therefore is:
Substituting for the surprisal (cf. Equation 2), we get Shannon's general formula for uncertainty:
The unit for uncertainty is bits per symbol. The H function forms a symmetrical (multidimensional) curve that peaks when all symbols are equally likely and falls towards zero when one of the symbols becomes dominant.
At the start of this section, we said that information can be considered to be the decrease in uncertainty. Using Equation 4, we can express information. Information relates to communication and uncertainty as follows.
Denition 4. Suppose we have an uncertainty H before before an event (such as the transmission of a message) and that uncertainty after the event is H after . Then the information that was gained in the event equals
This is what Shannon calls the rate of information transmission. Thus, information always relates two points in time, and the uncertainties at those times. Information relates to privacy loss in planning as follows. Consider the case of two agents, entering into negotiations for some aspect of their planning problems. Before the negotiations, the uncertainty with regard to the other agent's plan equals some amount H before . During their negotiations, agents may learn about certain aspects of the other agent's plan. In particular, they may receive information about certain actions (not) being executed at a certain time point.
After the negotiations, the uncertainty will therefore be reduced to some amount H after .
The amount of information thus gained equals H before − H after . This is precisely the privacy that the other agent has lost.
Running Example
Before we discuss the details of our approach, let us give a simplied example of our approach. Consider the typical Logistics benchmark domain, in which an agent is tasked with transporting goods within a city. This domain has three types of actions: move, load and unload , which for the sake of simplicity, we assume to be mutually exclusive. Furthermore, assume that dur (move) = 3 and dur (load ) = dur (unload ) = 2. Suppose that we observe again, an unload action cannot take place at time 5 here, since a move is required between a load -unload pair. These are two of the constraints that the plan must adhere to.
The bottom half shows the possible plans for the other two options. Looking at the constraints on the remainder of the plan, we can see it makes no dierence whether we start with a move action, or with no action. Therefore, we merge the load nodes at time 3, and record that there are two possible ways to arrive at this node (as signied by the superscript 2 in the label). For the same reason, we merge the load -load -move branch from the top half with the X-load 2 -load 2 -move 2 branch from the bottom (where X is either a move or no action), obtaining an unload 3 node. Counting the total number of unload nodes at time 10
(taking into account nodes with multiple paths), we observe that a total of 10 possible plans exist, in which a load action is executed at time 3 and the corresponding unload action at time 10. Notice how we are observing a number of incomplete plans here.
2 For example, one would expect at least two more unload actions for the top-most path, which has 3 load actions and only one unload action.
The same graph for all plans of length 12 is left as an exercise to the reader. It has a total of 58 plans. Recall from Equation 1 that the uncertainty associated with M possible options is H = log 2 (M ). Hence, an agent who agrees with another agent to load an item at time 3, and to deliver it at time 10, incurs a privacy loss of R = H before − H after = log 2 (58) − log 2 (10) = 2.536. This is a 57% decrease over H before = log 2 (58) = 5.858.
However, not all of these possible plans are equally likely. For example, one of the possible (incomplete) plans of length 12 has 6 consecutive load actions. This might be a very rare occurrence. Therefore, we will add probabilities (or rather: frequencies) to the graph to derive a weighted uncertainty, as per Equation 4. To capture those probabilities, as well as the constraints on the plans as we have seen above, we rst present an alternate model of the planning problem.
Modeling the Constraints and Probabilities of a Planning Domain
As we have shown in the previous paragraph, in order to compute the number of possible plans, we need to list the constraints on those plans (e.g. an unload action can only occur after a corresponding load action), as well as probabilities, so that we can weigh the dierent plans in determining the total uncertainty. This knowledge is captured in a tuple C, P 2 Notice that this is dierent from a partial plan, as used in partial order planners [38] . A partial plan may have any number of aws (such as unsatised preconditions, etc.), whereas our incomplete plans have no such aws. They are unnished in the sense that the identied constraints suggest that additional actions should be appended.
where C is a set of constraints, and P is a set of probabilities. The constraints represent the particular forms valid plans can take; the probabilities dene the likelihoods of actions under these constraints. Domain analysis tools such as TIM [11] can support the construction of the set of constraints.
Again, we note that substantial knowledge about the agent's performance is required. This is especially true for the details of P. Since it is unrealistic to assume that an opponent has such knowledge, this metric is not meant to be a measure that a particular agent can use to quantify the amount of information it has learned. Rather, it can be used by agents to estimate their loss. A typical use might be for an agent to weigh the potential benet of a negotiation step versus the potential loss in information it may incur.
4.1
The Constraints C
The set of constraints C denes some rules that plans have to adhere to. Some of these follow from the preconditions and eects of actions; others are more specic domain knowledge that rule out certain valid, but illogical plans. For example, in the logistics domain that was introduced before, the fact that an unload action has to be preceded by a load action follows from the preconditions and eects. However, it would be illogical to have these two actions one after the other without a move action in between, as the purpose of a load action is to bring the package to another location. Moreover, we can assume that planning problems in this domain never start with a package already loaded, so we can never satisfy an unload action from the initial state (this is further restriction of the rst example we just gave).
The set of constraints C describes patterns that can be distinguished in valid, but more importantly, actual plans. This restricts the set of plans that we will count to plans that may actually occur. In each of those plans, we can identify at least one of the constraints in C that justies each of the actions.
Denition 5. The set of all constraints is denoted by C, and is dened as follows. Let O N be dened as the set of actions from O, annotated with an identier: 
• o 1 is an atomic connective (rather than constraint) requiring the presence of o 1 ; • (c 1 ) is a chaining constraint;
• c 1 ∧ c 2 is chaining constraint that requires both c 1 and c 2 to be true; and 3 Thus, an action in the plan can satisfy the left-hand side of at most one ⇒-constraint, but multiple →-constraints.
• c 1 ∨ c 2 is a chaining constraint that requires either c 1 or c 2 to be true (or both).
4. For a chaining constraint c ∈ C, and an action o ∈ O N ,
•
Secondly, we dene mutex constraints, denoting pairs of actions that cannot occur together. 2. For two atomic mutex constraints c 1 , c 2 ∈ C, c 1 ∧c 2 is a mutex constraint that requires both c 1 and c 2 to be true.
For actions
Example 6. The constraints we listed at the start of this section for the logistics domain can be expressed as follows.
• (load
. A load action precedes the corresponding unload action, and a move action is to be present in between (notice how a move action can support multiple load ⇒ unload pairs); and
. Only load and move actions can follow from the initial state (unlike unload actions);
• move 1 × move 2 . A move action may follow another move action; and
• load load move move unload unload . All actions are mutually exclusive, with each other and themselves.
Notice that the move 1 × move 2 -constraint is redundant, as the → move 1 -constraint would allow for a move-action to be satised from the initial state after an earlier one. This is a highly unlikely case, however, as a single move suces. It therefore warrants a special condition, so that we can assign it its own probability in the next section. 
load load move move unload unload } 
Example 11. (Continued from Example 7.) One of the partial plans in Figure 1 , is the following: load , load , load , move, unload . The justications of the load and move actions can be straight-forward instantiations of the → load 1 and → move 1 constraints, respectively.
The justication of the nal unload action is depicted in Figure 2 . Here, the arrows represent the substitution θ. Since a strict ordering is implied by this plan, none of the mutex constraints is violated and the plan satises the constraints.
Notice how the justication does not have to be unique. In this case, the move action can also be justied by the same constraint as the unload action is. In that case, the constraint In case there are multiple justications for a given action, we prefer the largest justication.
c 1 forms a longer chain, i.e. n 1 > n 2 . This largest justication of an action o is denoted by γ(o); Γ(∆) = o∈∆ γ(o) denotes the set of largest justications for each action in a plan ∆.
In the next section, we show how we can generate plans using these constraints. Instead of nding a substitution that satises a constraint for a given plan, we can grow plans by expanding them with actions that would be justied by the plan. First, however, we introduce probabilities, so that we can establish the likelihood of the generated plans.
4.2
The Probabilities P
The constraints show what kind of plans are valid. They do not show us, however, how likely the generated plans are. This is what the probabilities P will specify. Intuitively, P lists the probabilities of actions, given their justications. By multiplying the probabilities for all actions in a plan, we get the total probability for a plan: P(∆). In general, we are often dealing with incomplete plans. Therefore, the probability P(∆) here should not be regarded as the probability of the plan in itself, but rather as the probability that a plan has ∆ as a sub plan.
We start by dening the set of probabilities P that is part of the tuple C, P . This is then extended to a probability function P : P → R that associates a probability with a plan.
Denition 12. Formally, the set of probabilities P is a map C → [0, 1 . Given a tuple C, P , P associates a probability P(c) to each of the (normalised) chaining constraints c ∈ C. Additionally, for each chaining constraint c of the form c =→ o 1 1 · · · n−1 o n it assigns a probability to the constraint ♦ → o 1 1 · · · n−1 o n , denoted by ♦c. The purpose of the latter probabilities is to distinguish between action occurrences in the plan and those at the very beginning of a plan.
The true probability of a constraint is usually unknown. However, we assume that we have access to previous plans, from which we can estimate the probability by the respective frequencies.
Example 13. (Continued from Example 7.) Given the set C of constraints for the logistics domain, we may observe the following probabilities P:
The interpretation of a set P of probabilities is as follows: suppose we have a plan ∆ with justications Γ(∆). Then, the probability of ∆ equals the product of the probabilities of the individual justications. However, for justications γ(o) of actions o at the beginning of a plan (i.e. actions o ∈ ∆ for which holds ∃o ∈ ∆ · o ≺ * o), we have to use the probability of the constraint ♦γ(o).
otherwise Given a tuple C, P and a plan ∆, such that C |= ∆, using a set of (largest) justications Γ(∆). Then, the probability of the plan, given by the function P(∆) : ∆ → [0, 1 equals
Example 15. This concludes our denition of the additional domain knowledge C, P that is required to compute the number of possible plans. In the next section, we will show how we can use this knowledge to determine privacy loss.
Counting Plans
In Section 3.2, we gave an introductory example of counting plans, cf. Figure 1 . However, in order to count the plans, we don't have to actually generate the graph that we used to show this number. Instead, we will generate the plans and count them as we go along.
Our algorithm is loosely based on that of the renement planning approach [15, 16] . we are interested about the intrusion by a coalition of agents that share their knowledge, 4 The base case, in which the opponent has no information at all, can be computed using a plan ∆ = {o 0 , o∞}, ≺, τ . 
// determine the applicable actions
extensions ← extensions ∪ {o}
14
// expand the plan with applicable actions taking into // account possible parallelism
// count the plans recursively we can simply add all actions known by the coalition. Furthermore, we take as input the domain knowledge C, P , a time step t (initially 0), that keeps track of which part of the possibilities we have already tried, and a threshold σ that determines the minimum probability that we are interested in. The algorithm starts by initialising some variables in lines 2-5. The variable fringe is initialised to the rst action that starts at time t or greater.
In the following, we will only consider adding actions as new justications for later actions, and expand upon partial justications for earlier actions.
Next, lines 6-9, we count the plan ∆ if it is justied by the constraints (which means that it is a valid possibility that has to be taken into account), or if there are any actions before time t that are not justied. If there are any unjustied actions before time t, it means that we can no longer justify them, as we only consider justications after time t in the next steps, as explained above. In that case, we have reached a dead end. in C and the ordering constraints ≺ prevent some start times to be computed, as this would violate some constraints. In that case, τ = ⊥ and we ignore the particular combination of actions O. If τ is valid, however, we use it to construct a new plan ∆ and add it to the list of new plans plans, if its probability is greater than or equal to the threshold value σ,
i.e. P(∆ ) ≥ σ.
Finally, we recursively count all plans ∆ ∈ plans, increasing the time t to τ (fringe), as this is the time that we are now considering, or to τ (fringe) + 1 in the case that we did not add any actions (i.e. ∆ = ∆ ), and we want to consider the next action.
Example 16. We apply the algorithm to the problem given in Section 3.2. We start with the initial partial plan that consists of a load action at time 3, and an unload action at time 10. As indicated the parameter t is initialised to 0, and σ is set to an arbitrary value, low enough to expand the rst few plans. The initial plan does not satisfy the constraints (as the unload action cannot be justied), so it is not counted. The load action is the rst action with a start time greater than t, so is selected to be the fringe. Given the constraints given in Example 7 there are three possibilities: (i) we include a load action (either directly from the → load constraint, or because it starts the load → move → unload constraint that provides a justication for the unload action at time 10), (ii) a move action (due to the → move constraint), or (iii) we do nothing. In the rst two cases, we increase t to τ (load ) = 3; in the last case to τ (load ) + 1 = 4.
In the latter case, we next select the original unload action as the fringe. Again, we can add load and move actions (by the same reasoning as before). In the second case, we can justify all actions in the plan and we count it as a possibility, in the former case we cannot.
The third case, where we decide not to add any actions, leads to a dead end, as we cannot possibly justify the unload action.
The process we describe here is depicted in Figure 3 . This also shows how, when we decide to add a load action, successive tries to add additional actions before the load action at time 3 end in failure as computeStartTimes will not be able to return a set of start times that does not violate any mutex constraints.
Remark. Notice that during the construction of plans, the constraints that re (as a result of which actions are included in the plan) can be stored. This prevents justications having to be computed during later iterations of the algorithm.
The counting of possible solutions has its own complexity class: #P [29] . In our particular case, the complexity is exponential in the number of action types. (Notice that considering the sets O ∈ 2 extensions instead of just the actions o ∈ extensions in line 15 is merely to cut down on the number of recursions. It does not constitute a higher degree of complexity.) In general the number of action types is far less than the number of action instantiations (that take into account all possible permutations of parameters). Hence, while exponential, it would only add a relatively minor overhead when planning.
Alice and Bob (whom we met in the introduction) are wary of nding themselves in the same situation again as they did with Eve. They can use this algorithm to improve their interaction modules and prevent this to some degree as follows. Whenever the interaction modules detect an empty ride, it will compute the amount of privacy lost by announcing this empty ride. This can be computed by comparing the current amount of privacy that is lost H before (by running the count algorithm on a partial plan that reects the current knowledge that the other party has) by the amount H after that would be lost when the opponent has the additional information (using a partial plan that reects this). The cost associated with the empty ride and the privacy value are then compared to a threshold value for each agent, taking into account the information that was already shared with that agent. (Alice and Bob might be willing to incur a higher degree of privacy loss to each other than to newcomers, so the threshold values may dier from agent to agent.) If the privacy loss is less than the threshold value for some of the partners, the empty ride is announced to those partners.
Upon receiving an announcement, the interaction modules decide whether any oers can be made at all. If so, then these oers are again compared to a threshold value (which may be dierent from the initial value) and any oers deemed rational are then put forward. In this way, privacy loss is kept to a minimum, and is only incurred if the cost incurred without sharing the information makes it worth it. This may lead to less optimal solutions, as some empty rides and oers are not announced. Such is the cost of privacy. 6 Related Work
Multiagent Planning
As already stated in the introduction, research on multiagent planning methods has been driven by privacy concerns of the autonomous actors involved. In this lies the most important dierence with the eld of distributed planning, which is concerned with planning in a distributed environment. One of the earliest attempts at solving this problem is that of
Corkill [4] . His interest stemmed from situations where sensory devices, processing capability, and devices to be controlled have wide spatial distributions. This clearly shows the dierence in perspective: the focus is on a single system, that is distributed in nature. The same view is present in an early overview article on the area [9] . Several approaches have emerged from the distributed planning research. The rst is the use of social laws. Methods that revolve around the plans that are built themselves have also been developed. Plan merging techniques assume that planners compute base plans separately, after which these plans are analysed to detect and resolve conicts, and exploit possible positive interactions. George [12] , Yang [39] (in particular Chapter 7) and Tsamardinos et al. [28] all take this approach. Yang et al. [40] and Foulser et al. [10] combine this with social laws to ensure ecient merging. Several methods have been designed based on the concept of exchanging information on (parts of ) the plan. The Partial Global Planning approach [8] is based on the premise that agents inform other agents of parts of their plans that they think are of use to the other agent, or may lead to conicts. The agents then build a partial global plan that collects the received information. From this, they can distill positive interactions that can be exploited and negative ones that have to be repaired.
The work done in multiagent planning largely follows the same lines. Privacy, however, takes a more prominent role in these works. Privacy features either explicitly, or is implicitly present as self-interested agents are concerned. Distributed planning techniques are all adapted to this change in situation: plan merging (for example by De Weerdt [5] ), market theory (such as proposed by Sandholm and Lesser [21] ) and plan exchanges (as exemplied by the Generalised Partial Global Planning approach [6] and the work by Von Martial [35] ).
Specialised methods have been developed as well. For example, Van der Krogt and De
Weerdt [33] propose to use plan repair techniques to merge sub goals that are being exchanged. It is important to note that none of these systems explicitly mentions a measure of privacy, although some claim to be built around the principle of privacy.
Multiagent Systems and Privacy
There are several other sub elds of multiagent systems that have looked at privacy issues. Mitra [26] . However, the privacy metric here is the size of the smallest coalition necessary to deduce an agent's costs for certain tuples. Wallace and Freuder [36] consider a measure of privacy loss that is very close to ours. Their work, like ours, is based on information entropy.
However, the application of information theory is more straight-forward as they consider the uncertainty of each of the variables in the constraint satisfaction problem, rather than having to apply it to an additional data structure (i.e. the plan) as we do. Recent work by
Maheswaran et al. [17] proposes a general quantitative framework to analyse privacy loss in DCOP/DisCSP. The three earlier approaches can be seen as specic instances of this framework.
Beyond DCOP and DisCSP, research on privacy is undertaken in the agent community at large. This includes work on cryptographic techniques, secure auctions and randomisation (see e.g. work by Brandt [1] , Van Otterloo [34] and Naor [18] ). Of particular interest to planning is the work on randomisation (e.g. Paruchi et al. [19] and Van Otterloo [34] ).
These approaches assume that actions and behaviours can be observed. By choosing ac-tions in a randomised fashion (e.g. using policies with a high entropy) agents can try to provide minimal information on their preferences, while still attaining their goals. Yu and
Cysneiros [41] discuss the privacy aspect of the design of a multiagent system in relation to competing design aspects such as cost, performance, usability, etc. A systematic framework is proposed to support system analysts and designers in the trade-os involved.
Conclusions
Although privacy is an issue that is often mentioned in work on multiagent planning (as well as multiagent approaches to dierent problems), heretofore this notion was neither made explicit, nor analysed. The present work shows how Shannon's Information Theory can be applied to planning to derive meaningful denitions of concepts such as uncertainty, information and privacy loss in terms of the action types that an agent's plan consists of.
This denition of privacy loss allows an agent to establish how much privacy it has lost by giving out certain information. Proactively, it can be used to establish how much would be lost, if certain options during negotiation were acted upon. It is less useful as a tool to evaluate the worth of the information one has just learned about an opponent's plan; it requires detailed knowledge about the agent's domain.
A number of extensions to this work seem obvious. Firstly, it seems reasonable to consider more than just the type of action. Our model is limited in the sense that we do not distinguish between knowing that a move action takes place, and knowing the precise locations. There may be domains where such a distinction is vital and requires a more rigorous assessment then our current model allows for. We conjecture that an extension of the domain constraints that allows for parameters of actions, rather than just action types, could possibly solve this issue.
Secondly, we are interested in obtaining approximations for the number of possible plans in a given situation. Especially when we start reasoning over possible action parameters, this can become quite important, as the search space multiplies by the number of possible parameters. Solution counting algorithms for CSPs (such as presented by Pesant [20] ) may be employed for this purpose, as several ecient translations of planning into CSP exist.
Most importantly, however, this work provides the means to evaluate multiagent planning systems on their privacy impact and allows new multiagent planning systems to be designed.
Whereas before, privacy was mentioned as a driving force but not explicitly taken into account, the existence of a metric for privacy loss can direct research to new algorithms that are optimised for privacy. This would also entail research into the relation between privacy loss and other factors such as optimality and search eciency. Also, it would need to factor in trust, to establish threshold values for the dierent agents. 
